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This is the second monograph in the new series entitled Research Notes in 
Artificial Intelligence, edited by D. Sleeman and N. Sridharan. Cohen's work 
is important because it is one of the more theoretical studies to come along from 
AI researchers in the last decade. The book is very innovative, written in a style 
that is both clear and refreshing. Cohen's stated purpose is to argue openly 
against numerical knowledge representation schemes that are currently in vogue 
in approximate r asoning. 
Cohen's basic premise is that in a world where almost nothing is certain, our 
knowledge (of uncertainty) enables us to act as if almost nothing is uncertain. 
The main question then is how to represent and reason with one's knowledge 
about uncertainty. Cohen argues that a great deal is known about uncertain 
situations besides the degree or strength of belief in each assertion tested. He 
states that there are many kinds of uncertainty, some preferable to others, and 
that certainty depends not only on evidence but also on the importance or gravity 
of the uncertain situation. His conclusion is that particular kinds of uncertainty, 
when they interfere with problem-solving goals, must hemselves be regarded as 
problems to be solved. 
The book is mainly concerned with how these problems with uncertainty are 
either solved or discounted. Cohen develops a plausible model of human 
reasoning about uncertain situations that has consequences both within and 
beyond the boundaries of artificial intelligence. He begins with an overview of 
uncertainty management followed by a discussion of Bayesian techniques. The 
last part of the monograph is a detailed escription of SOLOMON, a program 
for reasoning about uncertainty using AI techniques. The main thrust is based on 
Cohen's premise that although uncertainty is most often represented in terms of 
probability, human reasoning under uncertainty is clearly not probabilistic. 
Cohen's fundamental concern about numerical probabilities i that they hide the 
reasoning that produces them. I quite agree with this statement. (Interested 
readers may find more details of another approach in a book by Negoita and 
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Ralescu, soon to be published by Van Nostrand, that provides a rigorous 
treatment of probabilities with fuzzy values.) 
Cohen espouses the approach that it is better to eschew numerical degrees of 
belief and instead associate linguistic "endorsements" with each domain 
inference rule. He believes that the theory of endorsements provides a richer 
representation f the factors that affect certainty and, more important, support 
multiple strategies for dealing with uncertainty. Specifically, linguistic endorse- 
ments (not numbers) are specified a priori; they take the place of the initial 
degrees of belief that are usually elicited from an expert when he or she produces 
an inference rule. Cohen's intention for rule endorsements is that they should 
provide a terminology for stating reasons for especially trusting or mistrusting 
the conclusion of each inference rule. For example, one might say that the 
condition of a rule is may-be-too-general, may-be-too-specific, or is exact, 
supported, necessary, or flexible. 
As an example, consider the endorsement "flexible." He says that it is 
sometimes desirable to indicate that a rule's condition eed not be precisely met. 
One way to do this is to use numerical inequalities on degrees of belief. Another 
way is to make the conditions disjunctive. For instance, we may have the 
condition (age = old). There is the problem, however, that our confidence in 
the condition may be related to how definitely the condition is met. So we arrive 
at a question: Is someone old if their 65th birthday was last week? What if the 
person is 85 years old? One may wish to specify a "credibility distribution" for 
a range of values, much as is done in the fuzzy set approach. The flexible 
endorsement of Cohen could easily specify a graded degree of belief depending 
on how well a datum satisfied a predicate. 
Cohen has not implemented this idea in SOLOMON because he is eager to 
avoid degrees of belief. His goal in that program was to see how one can reason 
with structured symbolic reasons for belief, and in this light, introducing 
strengths of belief seems like a "step backwards." 
To further exemplify the thesis of Cohen's book, imagine an inference rule of 
the form: 
if A and B and C then D. 
With A, B, and C believable, D should be believable too, provided there is 
nothing incredible about he inference itself. On the other hand, if one or more of 
the premises of the inference are not trustworthy, then we might want to trust the 
conclusion less. In standard logic, this is not a problem, since the truth of a 
conjunction of clauses is easily derived from the truth of the individual clauses. 
The situation is more complicated in systems that use numerical degrees of 
belief. In this case the premise of a rule has a number associated with it, as does 
the rule itself, and the numbers must be combined to produce another number, 
the "strength of belief" in the conclusion. But if, instead of simple truths or 
degrees of belief, we substitute linguistic endorsements (reasons for believing 
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and disbelieving) for A, B, and C, the question of what endorsement accrues to 
the conclusion D becomes quite complicated. Just as degrees of belief are 
propagated over inferences by combining numbers with functions, so must 
endorsements bepropagated over inferences by some sort of heuristics. In other 
words, given that one proposition implies another and that the premise has a set 
of endorsements, what endorsement should the conclusion accrue? A set of rules 
is needed to propagate ndorsements over inferences. These serve the same 
purpose as combining functions to make a rule sensitive to the context in which it 
is used, but the context is now a set of endorsements instead of a single degree of 
belief. The reader will find in Cohen's book a detailed description and many 
examples of the use of endorsements. 
Before Cohen's book, AI specialists eem to have deliberately kept the 
linguistic and numerical approaches separated. Cohen's work will hopefully 
serve to put the linguistic approach solidly into the AI literature and should not 
be regarded as an oddity. It enables one to consider methods of approximate 
reasoning in a new light, in terms of both advantages and disadvantages of the 
various approaches discussed above. 
There is much to be gleaned from the work that has been done by Cohen. The 
book raises many questions. For example, what is the real difference between 
plausible and approximate reasoning? What is in a word, and what is in a 
number? Can words be modeled by numbers? By functions? Cohen's book 
should prove a turning point in AI studies if for no other reasons than that it 
provides a nonmyopic ontext in which to study reasoning and casts serious 
doubt on probabilities represented by numbers. It is the belief of this reviewer 
that the solution to the problems the work addresses will not come from 
empirical investigations alone, but from empirical investigation i formed by a 
recognition of the nature of the theoretical problem involved. 
